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DO WE SEE APPLES AS
EDIBLE?
by
BENCE NANAY
Abstract: Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that
it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible,
we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis
of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and
do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I
point out that Susanna Siegel’s influential argument in favor of the claim that
we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that
we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the
property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general.
I. Introduction
We perceive objects as having various properties. We perceive them as
having a certain color, a certain shape and a certain spatial location, for
example. The question I would like to examine here is whether we perceive
them as having a kind of property that is less obviously perceptual: the
property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general.
The first thing to note is that there are two ways of asking this question
that correspond to two different ways of thinking about perceptual expe-
riences. According to some, perceptual experiences represent objects as
having various properties.1 If we go along with this assumption, the ques-
tion will be: what properties are represented by perceptual experiences.
But according to others, perceptual experiences do not represent anything:
they are not representations at all.2 They may be thought of as ‘presenting’
or ‘being sensitive’ to some properties, but they do not represent these
properties. If we accept this framework, the question is what properties
perceptual experiences are sensitive to. The important point is that regard-
less of whether we accept a ‘representational’ or a ‘relational’ view of
perceptual experience,3 the question about which properties are perceptu-
ally experienced and which ones aren’t can (and should) be raised. In what
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follows, I will use the ‘representational’ terminology and assume that
perceptual states represent objects as having various properties, but the
argument can be rephrased to fit the relationalist framework.
Most of the discussion about what properties are represented by per-
ceptual experiences concerns sortal properties. When I am looking at the
object in front of me do I perceive it as a table or do I perceive it as having
a certain shape, size and color and I only infer that it is a table? In other
words, besides the properties of having certain shape, size and color, is the
property of being a table also represented in perception?
I will not take sides in this debate, as my aim is to show that properties
that could be thought of as even less obviously perceptual are represented
in perception: the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general.
But I will use some important considerations and arguments from the
debate about the perceptual representation of the property of being a
table. The structure of my argument is as follows. First, I try to show that
Susanna Siegel’s influential argument in favor of the claim that we repre-
sent the property of being a table perceptually does not work. Second, I
argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in
question with the property of being Q-able.
The claim that we perceive objects as Q-able is not new. I myself argued
recently that our perceptual system represents objects as edible, climbable
or Q-able in general.4 My main concern there, however, is to establish that
our perceptual system represents properties of this kind – consciously or
unconsciously. For the purposes of that argument, explicitly remained
neutral about whether these representations, which I label ‘action-oriented
perceptual states’ are conscious.5 The present paper, in contrast, is about
perceptual experiences. The question is whether we are perceptually aware
of properties like edible, climbable or Q-able in general. Everything I say
in this paper is about perceptual experiences: when I talk about ‘seeing’ in
what follows, that is to be understood as ‘consciously seeing’ (much like
the concept is used by Fred Dretske).6 The argument in the present paper
supports my earlier, more general claim, but it goes further: it aims to
make a stronger claim: at least sometimes, we consciously perceive objects
as edible.7
II. Are sortal properties represented in perception?
Susanna Siegel argues that some sortal properties (she calls them
K-properties), like being a pine tree or being a table, are represented in
perception. In this section, I will try to show that her argument is vulner-
able to an important objection. Then I will try to fix Siegel’s argument in
such a way that it does show that some not obviously perceptual proper-
ties, like that of being Q-able, are represented in perception.
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Siegel’s argument is the following. Take two experiences, E1 and E2: the
experience of a tree before and after taking a course on the typology of
trees, respectively. Here is what we can say about these two experiences:
(0) The overall experience of which E1 is a part differs from the overall
phenomenology of which E2 is a part.
(1) If the overall experience of which E1 is a part differs from the
overall phenomenology of which E2 is a part, then there is a
phenomenal difference between the sensory experiences E1 and E2.
(2) If there is a phenomenal difference between the sensory experiences
E1 and E2, then E1 and E2 differ in content.
(3) If there is a difference in content between E1 and E2, it is a
difference with respect to sortal properties represented in E1 and
E2.
(Conclusion) Sortal properties are represented in perception.
So the overall experience of seeing a pine tree before learning about pine
trees is different from the overall experience after having learned this (0).
This difference is perceptual difference (1) and it is due to the difference of
the properties represented in perception in the two cases (2). Finally, this
difference with regards to the represented properties is a difference with
regards to the represented sortal properties.
I accept premise (0), (1) and (2), for the sake of argument – I will have
more to say about them in Section VI. I will argue against (3).
Denying (3) (while accepting (2)) would amount to saying that E2
represents some (non-sortal) property, whereas E1 does not and this
explains the difference in phenomenology without any need to talk about
sortal properties.
Siegel considers a version of this way of arguing against (3). The sug-
gestion is that E1 and E2 differ with respect to the Gestalt-properties (i.e.
complex shape, size and color-properties) they represent. E1 represents
some Gestalt-property and E2 represents some other Gestalt-property.
Neither of them represents any sortal properties. Siegel admits that this
explanatory scheme may work in some cases, but she argues that it does
not work in all cases.
She gives the following example for a case where the appeal to Gestalt-
properties breaks down. X has an unusual facial expression when he is
expressing doubt. When I first saw him making this face, I had no idea that
he was expressing doubt. But as I got to know him, I learned to recognize
his doubtful expression. E1 is my experience of X’s face before I knew it
was expressing doubt and E2 is my experience after I came to know his
expression. Siegel assumes, rightly, that there may be a phenomenal dif-
ference between E1 and E2. Importantly, she claims that:
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. . . it seems implausible to suppose that there must be a change in which color and shape
properties are represented before and after one learns that it is doubt that the fact so
contorted expresses.8
The structure of Siegel’s argument is then the following. There are cases
where all the following are true:
(a) E1 and E2 represent the same Gestalt-properties.
(b) Still, there is a phenomenal difference between E1 and E2.
(c) The phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 must be a repre-
sentational difference (this follows from step (2) above).
(Conclusion) Hence, E1 and E2 must represent different sortal
properties
I will not question (b): it does seem that there is a phenomenal difference
between seeing X’s doubtful expression before and after learning that it
expresses doubt. I have already accepted (c). But I will try to point out that
(a) is ambiguous and that it does not seem to be a plausible assumption if
we do some disambiguating.
III. The importance of attention
We attend to some, but not all, the properties we represent objects as
having. Some properties we represent without attending to them, but some
others we represent and attend to.9 As William James famously wrote,
‘attention [. . .] out of all the sensations yielded, picks out certain ones as
worthy of notice and suppresses all the rest. We notice only those sensations
which are signs to us of thingswhich happen practically [. . .] to interest us’.10
To put it very simply, some properties are represented pre-attentively and a
subset of these properties is also represented post-attentively.11
In the light of this distinction, premise (a) of Siegel’s argument can mean
one of the following two claims:
(a1) E1 and E2 pre-attentively represent the same Gestalt-properties.
(a2) E1 and E2 post-attentively represent the same Gestalt-properties.
My worry is that while we have good reason to believe that (a1) is true,
what would be needed for Siegel’s argument to work is (a2). But it is far
from clear that we have any reason to hold (a2).
I will not question claim (a1), which seems convincing enough. In the
case of E1 and E2, we have the same object in front of us, and this object
has the very same properties. Our perceptual apparatus is also sensitive to
the same properties in the two cases. Hence, it seems reasonable to say that
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E1 and E2 represent the same Gestalt-properties pre-attentively. But it
would be a much stronger claim to say that they represent the same
Gestalt-properties post-attentively.
At this point some could interject and question the assumptions I have
been making about the relation between attention and perceptual repre-
sentation. More precisely, it could be, and has been, suggested that in
order for a property to be represented in my perceptual experience, I must
be attending to this property. In other words, there is no such thing as
pre-attentive representation: attention is necessary for being represented in
a perceptual experience.12 Note, however, that if we think about the rela-
tion between attention and perceptual representation this way, this does
not influence my argument: if attention is necessary for being represented
in a perceptual experience, then we have no reason to believe that (a1) is
true. But this leaves my argument, which questions (a2), intact. Again, the
structure of my argument is that even if we have reason to buy (a1), we
have no reason to believe that (a2) is true. If (a1) is untenable, all the better
for my argument.
Let is go back to the example of the pine tree again. After I have
familiarized myself with the various features of pine trees, when I see the
pine tree I am likely to attend to different features than the ones I attended
to before. I will attend to, say, the shape of the pine cones, the color of the
foliage, the diversity of the ways the needles are bundled in fascicles, etc. I
have not attended to any of these features before, as, according to the
example, I didn’t know much about any of them: I was just looking at a
tree without knowing much about the specifics of pine trees. In short, we
do have reason to accept (a1), but we also have reason to have doubts
about (a2). Note that the same argument can be given in the case of each
of Siegel’s examples: we have no reason to suppose, for example, that we
attend to the same features of a face before and after learning that the face
expresses doubt. After I have learned this, I will attend to features I have
not attended to before: the way the wrinkles run on the forehead, the
slightly raised eyebrows, etc.
Importantly, in order for Siegel’s argument to work, she needs (a2). E1
and E2 may represent the same Gestalt-properties pre-attentively, but the
argument is blocked if the difference between the phenomenal character
of E1 and E2 is explained by the different Gestalt-properties E1 and E2
represents post-attentively. The difference between the phenomenal
character of E1 and E2 can be explained without appealing to sortal
properties: it can be explained by which Gestalt-properties of the object we
are attending to.
Thus, a plausible suggestion is that the difference between E1 and E2 is
a matter of a difference in attention. And this suggestion should not sound
too surprising. Attention, as the famous ‘inattentional blindness’ phenom-
enon shows, can dramatically change what we experience.13
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This phenomenon has been known for a long time. Rezsö Bálint, a
Hungarian physician after whom Balint-syndrome was named, wrote in
1907:
It is a well-known phenomenon that we do not notice anything happening in our surround-
ings while being absorbed in the inspection of something; focusing our attention on a certain
object may happen to such an extent that we cannot perceive other objects placed in the
peripheral parts of our visual field, although the light rays they emit arrive completely at the
visual sphere of the cerebral cortex.14
More recently, various experiments about inattentional blindness have
demonstrated that we fail to experience those features of our surroundings
that we are not paying attention to.15 Probably the most famous inatten-
tional blindness experiment is the following.16 We are shown a short
video-clip of two teams of three, dressed in white and black, passing a ball
around. We are asked to count how many times the white team passes the
ball around. On first viewing, most of the observers come up with an
answer to this not very interesting question. On second viewing, however,
when there is no counting task to be completed, they notice that a man
dressed in gorilla costume walks right in the middle of the passing game,
makes funny gestures and then leaves. The gorilla spends nine seconds in
the frame and most viewers do not notice it when attending to the passing
of the ball.17
What these empirical and everyday phenomena show is that attention
can make a huge difference in what we experience.18 My suggestion is that
attention also plays a key role in explaining the difference between the
phenomenal character of E1 and E2. We have the following explanatory
scheme: E1 and E2 pre-attentively represent the same Gestalt-properties.
But as we attend to different Gestalt properties in E1 and E2 (say, we
attend to different ways of grouping the same pre-attentively represented
properties), the difference between the phenomenal character of E1 and E2
can be explained by the different Gestalt-properties E1 and E2 represent
post-attentively. As Siegel’s argument fails to rule out this explanatory
scheme, we have no reason to suppose that E1 and E2 represent different
sortal properties.
Does this explanatory scheme go against premise (2), a claim we have
already accepted? (2), again, was the following:
(2) If there is a phenomenal difference between the sensory experiences
E1 and E2, then E1 and E2 differ in content.
If what we mean by ‘content’ is ‘post-attentive content’,19 then (2) remains
correct: the phenomenal difference between E1 and E2 is explained in
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terms of representational content: E1 and E2 represent different Gestalt-
properties post-attentively.20
Thus, it seems that we have no justification for inferring (3) from (2),
which means that we have no reason to suppose that perceptual experi-
ences represent objects as having sortal properties.
The negative claim I made in this section is that Siegel’s argument
cannot be used to conclude that perceptual experiences represent sortal
properties. But I want to go further and use these considerations to say
something positive about what properties are represented in perception. I
will argue in the next section that although Siegel’s argument is not con-
clusive about whether sortal properties are represented in perception, if we
modify the argument slightly, it can yield a probably even more surprising
result: that the property of being edible and climbable is represented in
perception.
IV. Action-properties
We experience objects we are looking at as having a number of properties.
Some properties one experiences objects as having can’t be fully charac-
terized without reference to one’s action. I call these properties action-
properties. Being edible or climbable for me is an action-property, for
example. An object’s action-properties are relational properties: they
depend both on the properties of the object and of the agent: whether a
tree is climbable for me depends both on the tree and on my climbing
skills. (Quick warning about my terminology: I have been, and will be,
using the term ‘being edible’ as a synonym for ‘being edible for me’. There
may be a sense of the term ‘being edible’ that would be different from this,
but this would not express an action-property. My focus here is the expe-
rience of action properties and not the ordinary language analysis of the
concept of ‘edible’.)
Properties can be characterized by actions in many ways. Experiencing
an object as having an action-property can mean that I experience it
as something that affords21 or invites an action, as something not to
perform an action with, as something that can be used as a means of
performing the action I want to perform or as a potential obstacle that
should be overcome if I want to perform a certain action. I use the term
‘experiencing an object as having an action-property’ to cover all these
diverse cases.
The awareness of action-properties is in some circumstances a very
salient feature of our experience of the world. Suppose that I am running
on the street to catch my bus and a lamppost is in my way. I am likely to
experience the lamppost as an obstacle to the performance of my action of
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catching the bus: this property (the property of being an obstacle to the
performance of my action) is likely to be more salient than the color or
shape of the lamppost.
What this example is supposed to show is that we sometimes experience
objects as having action-properties. But I may do so perceptually or non-
perceptually and the example does not tell us which one is the case. The big
question is whether we experience objects as having action-properties
perceptually. Even though our awareness of action-properties of objects
seems more salient than their shape-, size- and color-properties, this does
not show that action-properties are represented in perception. In the next
section, I will use what remained of Siegel’s argument to show that at least
some of them are.22
My claim is not that all action-properties are perceptually represented
but that some are. Just which action-properties are represented in percep-
tion is a delicate and complex question but for the purposes of this paper
it is enough to note that some of the action-properties that are perceptually
represented are properties like being edible, climbable or Q-able in gen-
eral.23 A further qualification: my claim is not even that for every action Q,
being Q-able is perceptually represented. It is not true of many mental
actions and it is not true of highly complex actions like winning a war.24
Attributing the property of being winnable to an election is unlikely to be
an instance of perceptual attribution. But it is important to note here that
the claim I defend in this paper is that there are some actions, Q, such that
we (sometimes) perceive objects as Q-able. I do not claim that this is true
of all actions.
Before arguing for the claim that some action-properties are represented
in our perceptual experience, a couple of clarifications are in place. First,
we may experience an object as having a certain action-property, say, as
edible, but the object may fail to have this property. Our experience may
misrepresent action-properties. Conversely, often an object has a number
of action-properties, say, a tree is climbable for me, but I may not neces-
sarily experience it as having an action-property.
Second, we may experience the same object as having different
action-properties: I can experience a newspaper as having various action-
properties in different contexts: I can experience it as having an action-
property that cannot be fully characterized without reference to the action
of killing a fly, an action-property that cannot be fully characterized
without reference to my action of reading about the election results, etc.
Finally, experiencing action-properties is neither necessary, nor suffi-
cient for the performance of actions. Often, the agent experiences an object
as having an action-property, but the action itself is not performed. Con-
versely, we can perform actions without experiencing anything as having
any action-properties; if, for example, we act without attending to what we
are doing.
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V. Are action-properties represented in perception?
Let us now go back to Siegel’s argument for the claim that sortal proper-
ties are represented in perception. Here is the equivalent argument
concerning action-properties. Take two experiences, E1* and E2*: the
experience of representing a tree as climbable for me and the experience of
representing the same tree as climbable for my twin sister (assuming that
my twin sister is as tall as I am and has similar climbing skills).
These mental states are defined in terms of what property they represent:
the property of being climbable for me and the property of being climbable
for my twin sister, respectively. The definition of E1* and E2* leaves it
open whether they represent these properties perceptually. And I argue
that they do.
Here is what we can say about these two experiences:
(0*) The overall experience of which E1* is a part differs from the
overall phenomenology of which E2* is a part.
(1*) If the overall experience of which E1* is a part differs from the
overall phenomenology of which E2* is a part, then there is a
phenomenal difference between the sensory experiences E1* and
E2*.
(2*) If there is a phenomenal difference between the sensory experi-
ences E1* and E2*, then E1* and E2* differ in content.
(3*) If there is a difference in content between E1* and E2*, it is a
difference with respect to the action-property represented in E1*
and E2*.
(Conclusion) Action-properties are represented in perception.
I aimed to show that Siegel’s argument about sortal properties does not
work, because we can block the move from (2) to (3). Now I need to
show that when it comes to action-properties, (3*) does follow from (2*).
The main consideration against (3) was that it is possible that the dif-
ference between the phenomenal character of E1 and E2 is due to the
fact that while they represent the same Gestalt-properties pre-attentively,
they represent different Gestalt-properties post-attentively. Thus, the
difference is due to the difference in which non-sortal properties we
are attending to and not to the difference in what sortal properties are
represented.
I need to show that the same way of blocking the move from (2)
to (3) does not work in the case of the transition between (2*) and
(3*). In the case of Siegel’s example, it seems unreasonable to
suppose that we need to attend to the same feature of the object we are
looking at in E1 and E2. After I have learned about pine trees, I will be
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attending to different features of pine trees from the ones I attended
to before.
But, and this is where the difference lies between Siegel’s argument
and mine, in the case of E1* and E2* above, we are attending to the
very same features. Experiencing a tree as climbable for me and
experiencing it as climbable for you involve attending to the very same
features of the tree: the height of its lowest branches, the texture of its
bark, etc.
It is important to be clear about the structure of this argument. In the
case of Siegel’s example, I argued that in order to have experience E2, we
need to attend to features of the tree we could not attend to when having
E1, simply because we didn’t know about these features. In the present
case, in contrast, it is difficult to see what features one would need to
attend to in order to experience the tree as climbable for oneself that one
could (and would) not attend to when experiencing it as climbable for
someone else (with similar climbing skills). The plausible explanation of
the difference between E1 and E2 in terms of the difference in what we are
attending to, which blocked Siegel’s move from (2) to (3), does not seem
very plausible in the present case, as in the present case, we have reason to
believe that the two experiences represent the same Gestalt-properties not
only pre-attentively, but also post-attentively.
We can now put together the argument for (3*) adjusting Siegel’s
argument:
(a*) E1* and E2* represent the same Gestalt-properties both pre-
attentively and post-attentively.
(b*) Still, there is a phenomenal difference between E1* and E2*.
(c*) The phenomenal difference between E1* and E2* must be a rep-
resentational difference (this follows from step (2*) above).
(Conclusion) Hence, E1* and E2* must represent different
action-properties
As E1* and E2* represent the same Gestalt-properties not only pre-
attentively, but also post-attentively, the objection I raised against Siegel’s
original argument does not work here: the phenomenal difference between
E1* and E2* cannot be explained in terms of what we are attending to,
because we are attending to the same properties. And this argument can be
generalized to any pairs of experiences where the first experience is that of
seeing x as Q-able for me and the second experience is seeing x as Q-able
for you (as long as my and your Q-ing capacities are sufficiently similar).
Perceptual experiences may or may not represent sortal properties, but we
have an argument in favor of an even surprising claim, namely, that they
do represent (some) action-properties.
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VI. Sortal properties versus action-properties
I need to make an important clarification about the structure of the
argument I presented in this paper so far. I argued that Siegel’s move from
(2) to (3) is not justified, whereas my move from (2*) to (3*) is. But Siegel’s
argument for the claim that sortal properties are represented in perception
is a three-step argument and I have not analyzed Siegel’s arguments for (1)
and for (2) at all. And, as I accepted these steps of Siegel’s argument in the
case of action-properties, I also simply accepted (0*), (1*) and (2*) without
any argument. So strictly speaking, I have not argued for the claim that
action-properties are represented in perception. I only argued for a con-
ditional claim: if (0*), (1*) and (2*) are correct, action-properties are
represented in perception.
There is a further complication: Siegel talks about pine trees, whereas
I talk about climbability. We have seen how this difference makes
the transition from (2*) to (3*) different from the transition from (2)
to (3). But doesn’t this difference matter when it comes to the transition
from (0*) to (1*) and from (1*) to (2*)? The worry is that even if (1)
and (2) were correct, it may still be possible that (1*) or (2*) are false,
if there is a significant asymmetry between (1) and (1*) or between (2)
and (2*) that would make the application of Siegel’s arguments
in the case of action-properties problematic. Note, however, that
Siegel’s arguments for (1) and (2) make no reference to the details
of E1 and E2, they should apply to any pair of experiences that
satisfy (0). Thus, if her arguments for (1) and for (2) stand, I could
import them without any further complications into my argument for
(1*) and (2*).
But not everyone will accept Siegel’s argument for (1) and (2) (see
Brogaard ms, for example).25 As a result, I will sketch my own argument
for (1*) and (2*). Like Siegel, I assume that (0*) is true: I will assume
that the overall experience of which E1* is a part differs from the
overall phenomenology of which E2* is a part. To take a different, but
structurally similar example, suppose that I am playing basketball
against you (who has similar skills/height/weight as I do). The basketball
bounces towards us. Now, few would deny that experiencing it as being
catchable for myself has very different phenomenal character from expe-
riencing it as being catchable for you – it just feels different. These two
experiences follow the exact pattern I used to describe the difference
between E1* and E2*. Again, (0*) does not claim that this phenomenal
difference is perceptual in nature – all it says is that experiencing the tree
as climbable for me feels different from experiencing it as climbable
for you.26
It is an entirely different question whether this phenomenal difference is
a perceptual, or, as Siegel would say, a sensory one, and I don’t really
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know how intuitions or introspection could help us to decide what phe-
nomenal difference is sensory and what is non-sensory.27
In some cases, (1) may sound convincing. Consider the following
example. At a dinner partly, I’m eating a piece of meat that I take to be
chicken, when my host tells me that it is in fact a piece of rat meat (or
pigeon, etc.; use your favorite disgusting animal). My (gustatory) experi-
ence before she told me this is E1; my experience after that is E2. If I
am really disgusted by rats, then E1 and E2 are clearly different and
the difference seems to be a sensory/perceptual one: the meat will taste
different.
But I am not sure that we can find an example where everyone’s intui-
tions would converge to conclude that (1*) is correct. And even in the case
of the gustatory example above, the opponent of (1) can insist that the
difference in phenomenal character is not a sensory one. The same move
would be open to the opponent of (1*) as long as the argument I give in
favor of (1*) relies on intuitions and/or introspection.28
Remember, (1) and (1*) are claim about our perceptual phenomenol-
ogy: they are not about what properties are represented in perception, but
about what properties are part of our phenomenology. (1) and (1*) are not
about content: they are about perceptual, or as Siegel says, sensory, phe-
nomenology. The challenge is to find a non-intuitive, non-introspective
way of resolving this debate about phenomenology.
I argue at length for (1*), and for a general methodology for keeping
perceptual and non-perceptual phenomenology apart elsewhere.29 Here,
let me just sketch the gist of the argument. This argument does not rely on
either intuitions or introspection. It relies on a set of visual search experi-
ments. Patients with symptoms of unilateral neglect30 are slow and some-
times even unable to find objects defined by a salient visual property (such
as their color). Yet, they are capable of, and relatively efficient in, finding
objects defined by the action they can be used for.31 Two aspects of these
experimental findings need to be highlighted: first, these patients do expe-
rience the property of what an object can be used for. And, second, they
were, like most unilateral neglect patients, unaware of the shape, size and
color properties of the objects presented to them.
It is important to be careful about what these experiments demonstrate.
They do not directly show that the property of ‘being used for a certain
action’ (or ‘to be used for a certain action’) is perceptually represented in
healthy humans or even in patients with symptoms of unilateral neglect.
These findings only tell us what properties are part of the overall phenom-
enology of these patients (and what properties they are not). I aim to show
that these experiments nonetheless help us to show that normal humans
experience action-properties perceptually.
Remember Siegel’s argument in favor of (1): if the phenomenal differ-
ence between E1 and E2 is not sensory, then it must be due to an event that
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occurs somewhere later in the processing that has its own non-perceptual
phenomenology.32 Siegel goes on to argue that no candidate for such
non-sensory event counts as a plausible candidate, but this argument may
be questioned by some as it does not rule out that some non-sensory event
type that Siegel failed to consider could account for the phenomenal
difference.
But what the unilateral neglect patients’ visual search experiments show
is that in the case of these patients the phenomenology of what an object
can be used for is preserved while the phenomenology of seeing undoubt-
edly sensory properties, like color and shape was missing or delayed. Thus,
the phenomenology of what an object can be used for is temporarily prior
to the phenomenology of seeing color and shape.
This does not prove that the property of what an object can be used for
is processed earlier in the perceptual system than the property of color and
shape in healthy humans. What it does prove is that in healthy humans the
phenomenology of what an object can be used for is not an event that
comes after, and that is based on, the perceptual phenomenology of seeing
the object’s shape and size. If it were, then in those humans who have
missing or delayed phenomenology of seeing the object’s shape and size
would also have missing or delayed phenomenology of what the object can
be used for. But, as the experiments show, they don’t.
To sum up, the denier of (1*) would need to say that the event that
makes the overall phenomenology of E1* and E2* different occurs some
time after the perceptual processing. In other words, they would need to
say that the experience of whether the tree is climbable for me or for my
twin sister comes after the perceptual processing. But as we have seen,
patients with unilateral neglect experience properties of this kind without
experiencing undoubtedly sensory properties like shape and color. The
event that makes the overall phenomenology of E1* and E2* different
comes before (and in some cases completely without) sensory phenom-
enology of shape and color. But this means that the event that makes the
overall phenomenology of E1* and E2* different is a perceptual event: the
phenomenal difference between E1* and E2* is a sensory difference: (1*)
is true.
But there are some more general and more serious problems that the
denier of (1*) faces. More precisely, denying (1*) yields some very implau-
sible consequences for the way we should describe the phenomenal char-
acter of the experience of unilateral neglect patients when they are
performing the visual search task.
Again, the suggestion was that shapes and colors are unconsciously
processed and action-properties are part of the patients’ non-perceptual
phenomenology. What about their perceptual phenomenology then? The
objector is forced to conclude that these patients lack any perceptual
phenomenology while they are performing this visual search task. The
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only properties they are aware of are action-properties, but these proper-
ties are, by supposition, not part of their perceptual phenomenology. This
is an extremely problematic conclusion as these people are staring at
objects, perform visual tasks with what they see, talk about what they see,
manipulate what they see, and, importantly, consciously experience what
they see, nonetheless, the objector needs to say that they lack perceptual
phenomenology: there is nothing it is like for them to see these objects.
In other words, the objector is forced to say that it is possible to have a
conscious perceptual experience of an object and nonetheless lack visual
phenomenology altogether. If we allow for unconscious perception, it is
possible to perceive an object without any accompanying phenomenology,
but the consequence of denying that action-properties are part of percep-
tual phenomenology is something much more radical: it amounts to saying
that it is possible to have a conscious perceptual experience of an object
without any accompanying perceptual phenomenology – a claim that
comes dangerously close to a straight logical contradiction. If denying that
action-properties are part of perceptual phenomenology forces us to pos-
tulate such empty perceptual phenomenology during conscious percep-
tion, then we have strong reasons to accept (1*).
Two quick worries about this conclusion before I turn to (2*). First, this
argument was about unilateral neglect patients. Why is any of it relevant
when we try to understand what properties are part of the perceptual
phenomenology of healthy humans? The answer is that the argument from
unilateral neglect is a reductio argument: if we assume that in healthy
humans action-properties are not part of perceptual phenomenology, then
we get implausible results for unilateral neglect patients.
The second worry is the following. Even if the argument from unilateral
neglect is conclusive, how can we address the following intuitively plau-
sible idea: the difference between experiencing the tree as climbable for me
or for my twin sister is the matter of having some kind of (maybe imag-
ined?) experience of the action I would have to undertake.33 In the former
case, I do have an experience of this action (of climbing the tree) I would
have to undertake, whereas in the latter case, I don’t. I see the pull of this
intuition but I don’t see a conflict between this intuition and (1*). It may
very well be the case that I do (also) experience the action I would have to
undertake when I experience the tree as climbable for me. But (1*) is about
perceptual phenomenology: if I do in fact experience the action I would
have to undertake, do I experience it perceptually or non-perceptually?
Does it show up in my perceptual or in my non-perceptual phenomenol-
ogy? And my argument, if correct, shows that it must show up in my
perceptual phenomenology.
How about (2*)? (2*), like (2), is a special case of the general view called
intentionalism. Intentionalism is the view according to which the phenom-
enal character of an experience supervenes on the content of this
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experience. There are many versions of intentionalism, but the one that
(2*), and (2), is a special case of is intentionalism about specific sense
modalities: the claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual
experiences supervene on the content of these perceptual experiences.
Not everyone is an intentionalist in this sense. Hence, not everyone will
accept (2*) automatically. But it is important to emphasize that the most
convincing counterexamples against intentionalism fail to apply in the
case of (2*) because they all, in one way or another, have to do with
attention. They all have the same structure: two perceptual experiences
have the same content, but they have different phenomenal character
because our attention is different in the two cases. As David Chalmers
says, ‘the most plausible potential cases of phenomenally distinct visual
experiences with the same representational content involve differences in
attention’.34 If someone is moved by these counterexamples,35 they should
conclude that intentionalism is false: the phenomenal character of percep-
tual experiences does not supervene on the content of this experience, as in
these examples two perceptual experiences have the same content and yet
they have different phenomenal character.
I am not sure that these counterexamples to intentionalism are convinc-
ing.36 But what is important from our point of view is that they do not
count against (2*) as in the case of (2*) the difference between E1* and E2*
does not entail any difference in attention. In fact, as we have seen, this is
the most important difference between Siegel’s argument and mine that
allows me to argue for (3*) and blocks her argument for (3).
In order to argue for (2*) we do not have to accept intentionalism tout
court. We only need a much weaker claim: that the phenomenal character
of an experience supervenes on the content of this experience as long as the
attention does not change. We could call this claim intentionalism*. We
have seen that the reason why intentionalism has been considered to be
problematic is that there are scenarios where attention does change and
this may or may not bring about a change in phenomenology without a
change in content. But these counterexamples by definition do not count
against intentionalism*. And (2*) is a special case of intentionalism* given
that, as we have seen in the last section, there is no difference between E1*
and E2* in terms of the allocation of attention.
Thus, we have good reason to hold (0*), (1*) and (2*). And as I argued
that we can infer (3*) from (2*), we can conclude that at least some
action-properties are perceptually represented.
Finally, one may question the sharp distinction between sortal proper-
ties and action-properties. After all, action-properties like being Q-able
could be taken to be sortal properties. Hence, if the argument I presented
in this paper is correct, it provides indirect support for Siegel’s original
claim that sortal properties are perceptually represented. If we think of
sortal properties this way, I have no problem with this conclusion. I did
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not argue that sortal properties are not represented in perception. They
may very well be. I argued that some properties that are even less obvi-
ously perceptual, that is, action-properties, are represented in perception.
Those who take action-properties to be sortal properties can take my
argument to show which sortal properties are perceptually represented.
VII. Conclusion
Although saying that we literally see objects as edible or climbable may
sound quite provocative, it is not such a radical claim. The proposal I
defended here is that we sometimes see objects as edible or climbable. I do
not claim that we always do so. It happens quite often that we do not
perceive anything in our visual field as having action-properties.
More importantly, if our perceptual system was evolutionarily useful, it
must have been because it came in handy when our ancestors were per-
forming actions (on which their survival depended). Thus, our perceptual
system was selected for helping us to perform actions. It is hardly a very
surprising claim, then, to say that it was selected for representing objects as
having properties that cannot be fully characterized without reference to
the agent’s action.37
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commentator, Claire Batty, to an anonymous referee and to Susanna Siegel for detailed
comments. Somewhat confusingly, I gave a different paper (the one to be published as
‘Action-oriented Perception’) under the title of this paper a number of times (roughly,
between 2005 and 2007). The present paper is very different from that one (see Section I
above).
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